COMMENTARIES
CORRECTIVE JUSTICE AND LIABILITY FOR GLOBAL WARMING
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This brief Commentary focuses on Professor Farber’s suggestion
that corrective justice (CJ) might justify institutions imposing liability
on greenhouse gas (GHG) emitters so as to compensate the victims of
1
2
climate change. He advances other arguments as well, and indeed it
is plausible that considerations of overall well-being, or distributive
justice, might warrant some sort of liability scheme. I will not, however, address such considerations here.
If there is such a thing as CJ , what does it require? A standard
suggestion is this: CJ imposes a duty on the agent who has acted
wrongfully, and thereby caused loss to some individual, to repair the
3
loss. There are various aspects to this paradigm. The victim’s loss
(arguably) must be more than reduction of well-being; rather, it must
be a setback to some protected interest, an aspect of well-being or of
4
personhood that is singled out for concern as a matter of CJ. The
5
action must be causally connected to the loss. And the action must
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6

have been “wrongful” or “faulty.”
Each of these elements is illustrated by doctrines of tort law. This
is not to say that tort law actually tracks CJ. CJ theorists may simply
be incorrect in claiming that CJ is one component of morality. (Consequentialists deny that it is.) And, even if CJ theorists are correct,
tort law may in fact be shaped by both CJ and non-CJ considerations.
Still, tort law is the legal institution that CJ theorists believe has the
closest connection with CJ. It is therefore instructive to note the following: (1) Tort law focuses on personal injury or property harms,
rather than losses to well-being per se. There is no tort of diminution
of happiness and no tort of negligent infliction of pure economic
7
loss. (2) Tort liability, at least under the rubric of negligence, obtains
only if the defendant was both the cause-in-fact and the proximate
8
cause of the plaintiff’s loss. (3) Tort law typically requires fault in the
9
form of either “intentional” wrongdoing or negligence. Even socalled “strict liability” requires that the action causing loss satisfy some
further description, in part because the notion of imposing liability
10
for the sheer causation of harm is chimerical. For a given loss event,
there will be a multiplicity of causes of that event, including actions by
11
the victim.
Farber proposes that GHG emitters be held liable for environmental damage, specifically sea level rise, harm to natural systems such
12
as coral reefs or glaciers, and drought and loss of water supplies. An
obvious difficulty in justifying such liability as a matter of CJ is that
these environmental damage events are not themselves losses to indi-
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viduals’ paradigmatically protected interests. They do not constitute
(or directly cause) infringements of private property, physical injuries
to individuals, or death. An exception would be the loss of acreage to
coastal property owners, a quite direct result of sea level rise. By contrast, damage to natural systems and water supplies will not amount to
an invasion of private property interests, since these resources are not
(at least not typically) privately owned.
Can’t this difficulty be circumvented by imposing liability on GHG
emitters for a different set of harms—namely personal injury and private property damage, the core of tort law? Such a compensation
scheme would more readily satisfy the protected-interest element of
the CJ paradigm than Farber’s scheme, but would have greater difficulties in satisfying the causal-connection element. Since global
warming causes deaths, injuries, and property losses via environmental damage (or extreme weather events), the causal links between
a particular set of GHG emissions and those protected interests will
generally be more attenuated than the links between those emissions
and environmental damage.
A different possibility, preserving Farber’s focus on environmental
damage, is to conceptualize an ecosystem or water supply as public
property, belonging to the governmental entity with primary jurisdiction over this resource, or held in trust for the citizenry to which that
entity is politically accountable. Indeed, the main U.S. scheme for
rectifying environmental damage, the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), provides for
suits brought by the United States, the states, or Indian tribes, as trus13
tees for the damaged resources, rather than by private individuals.
Compensation to governmental entities for damage to public
property is not unimpeachable as a matter of CJ. Is the loss supposed
to be to the public entity itself (in which case one might wonder
whether artificial persons, such as governments, can be victims to
whom CJ creates duties of repair) or to the natural persons, i.e., individual citizens, whom the entity represents (in which case one might
wonder whether an individual’s interest in the publicly held resource
is the sort of protected interest that CJ safeguards)? But providing
compensation to public entities for environmental damage caused by
GHG emissions seems at least a promising approach to a compensation scheme that will fit within the CJ paradigm.
Upon whom, though, would liability be imposed? Who, for ex13
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ample, has a duty as a matter of CJ to compensate Australia for the
damage to its coral reefs caused by global warming? Are there GHG
emitters whose contributions to global warming, and thus to the damage to the public property of Australia, were wrongful (in some
sense)?
One route to wrongfulness is to show that the actor “intentionally”
caused the loss: that he acted with the very purpose of causing it,
knew that it would result from his action, or at least should have be14
lieved to a certainty or near-certainty that it would result. It is difficult to see how GHG emissions will be “intentional” in this sense.
GHG emissions are a byproduct of activities (using automobiles, generating electricity, running factories, etc.) that do not have global
warming as their very object. And, given the uncertainty about the
causes and consequences of global warming, it will be very difficult to
show that some group of GHG emitters knew, or had reason to believe
to a near-certainty, that any environmental damage—let alone the
particular damage claimed by some public entity (Australia, say)—
would result from its emissions.
Another route to wrongfulness is to show that the action, albeit
unintentional, was wrongful under some other description. But there
is a problem. GHG emissions, at least at the level of individual actors,
may have the structure of a moral collective action problem. A moral
collective action problem arises when there is a kind of action that, if
taken by every or most members of a group, has morally bad consequences, but that each member of the group is morally justified in tak15
ing. Assume, in particular, that the causal link between GHG emis14

“Intention” in the narrowest sense of specific intention, where the action is undertaken with the aim of producing the loss (either because the actor has that as his
ultimate goal or because he sees it as a means to some ultimate goal), may well be relevant to deontological wrongdoing. See KAGAN, supra note 4, at 100-05. Intention for
purposes of the “intentional” torts is the disjunction of specific intention and subjective near-certainty. See DOBBS, supra note 7, at 47-49. I have built in the further disjunct of objective near-certainty to suggest that GHG emitters do not meet even a very
generous version of “intention.”
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For a discussion of moral collective action problems, specifically problems created by subthreshold actions—actions that are too small to cause harm individually—
see Jonathan Glover, It Makes No Difference Whether or Not I Do It, 49 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN
SOC’Y (SUPP.) 171 (1975); Jonathan Harrison, Rule Utilitarianism and Cumulative-Effect
Utilitarianism, 5 CAN. J. PHIL. (SUPP. V) 21 (1979). For a skeptical view, see DONALD
REGAN, UTILITARIANISM AND CO-OPERATION 54-65 (1980). In this brief Commentary, I
do not mean to stake out a definitive position on the possibility of moral collective action problems and their precise structure, if they are possible. I simply mean to suggest that the issue is a serious one that anyone confronting the morality of global
warming needs to engage. Thresholds are intuitively possible and the most straight-
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sions and global warming has a threshold far above the increment of
GHGs produced by any given individual through any of her activities,
such as driving a gasoline-powered car, using electricity from coalfired power plants, or purchasing goods that were produced using
such electricity. Imagine, then, the position of an individual deciding
whether to reduce her own GHG emissions at some moderate cost—
for example, by switching to a more expensive hybrid automobile and
lowering her thermostat in winter. Because the individual’s own reduction in GHG emissions would not change global temperatures at
all (given the threshold hypothesis), that reduction apparently cannot
be morally required, at least qua global warming. Indeed, because the
reduction in GHGs imposes costs on the individual and members of
her household, in reduced material well-being and comfort, it is the
decision not to reduce her own emissions that appears to be morally
required, or at least morally supererogatory.
The problem here is not just a problem about causation. Tort
scholars puzzle over cases where but-for causation fails—for example,
where two careless backpackers, acting independently, flick cigarette
ashes which produce small fires that combine to destroy a forest, so
that neither act of ash-flicking was the but-for cause of the forest’s de17
struction. In that example, each backpacker’s action was negligent.
Each act of ash-flicking, taken individually, had substantial expected
costs, because in many possible states of the world ( just not the actual
world, as it turns out) there would be no other ash-flicker in the background and, thus, no fire without the act. By contrast, if an individ-
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ual’s own GHG emissions produce no change in global temperatures
regardless of the background level of GHG emissions produced by
other actors, then there is no state of the world in which the emissions
cause increased environmental damage and thus, apparently, no neg18
ligence in the individual act.
The existence of a threshold in the casual link between GHG
emissions and global warming is the easiest way to generate an (apparent) moral collective action problem. But such a problem could
also seemingly arise given a threshold in the link between global
warming and environmental damage or, more generally, given nonlinearities in the link between GHG emissions and global warming or
19
between global warming and environmental damage.
The possibility that GHG emissions constitute a moral collective
action problem is an important difference between liability for global
warming and the proposal that reparations be paid for slavery, a pro20
posal that Farber points to as a rough analogy. Individual slave owners did confront a sort of threshold with respect to creating a culture
of racial subordination—that is, no individual slave owner’s actions
may have made a difference to the existence and intensity of general
views about black inferiority—but, in addition, each individual slave
owner did very substantial wrong to the slaves he owned. So there is
no question about the wrongfulness of each slave owner’s actions,
taken alone, while there is a serious question about the wrongfulness

18

As Jonathan Harrison explains:
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of each GHG emitter’s actions, taken alone.
Whether GHG emissions truly do amount to a moral collective action problem depends on the science of global warming. For example, if the connection between GHG emissions and environmental
damage is linear, or if there are thresholds but they are below the
level of individual emissions, the problem disappears. The problem
may also, perhaps, be dissolved at the level of moral theory. Perhaps
the moral justifiability of an act depends, in part, on the justifiability
or consequences of some group of acts to which the individual act be21
longs.
Finally, it is possible (I suppose) that an action might be
“faulty” or “wrongful” as a matter of CJ even though it is morally justified. There are many difficult scientific and moral questions here, at
which I can only gesture. I simply wish to suggest that the possibility
of a moral collective action problem is one that anyone hoping to justify the imposition of liability on GHG emitters as a matter of CJ must
grapple with.
One way to address moral collective action issues in the design of
a liability scheme is to impose liability on “large” actors—those who
produced or induced a large quantity of emissions. It is possible that
neither China’s emissions, nor the emissions of all the cars produced
by Ford Motor Co., nor the emissions of an individual natural person,
make any difference, taken alone, to global temperatures. On the
other hand, it is possible that China’s emissions make a difference,
while Ford Motor Co.’s and the individual’s do not. But it seems virtually inconceivable that China’s emissions make no difference, while
Ford’s or the individual’s do. There are, to be sure, scenarios where
one individual makes a difference, while a whole group of different
individuals do not. Imagine that there are a billion and one buttons;
only one is connected to a huge nuclear bomb. I press that button
while a billion Chinese citizens simultaneously press the others. Thus,
China’s actions, en masse, do not cause nuclear destruction, while

21

For example, Harrison defends “cumulative effect utilitarianism” as a solution
to the problem of subthreshold actions:
[C]umulative-effect utilitarianism [contends] that I ought to omit an action if,
because of its cumulative effects, harm would be done if everybody were to do
it, or to perform an action if good were to be done if everybody were to do it,
regardless of the fact that, in the first case, it may by itself do no harm, or even
do good, and regardless of the fact that, in the second case, it may do no
good, and even do harm.
Harrison, supra note 15, at 28-29. Glover argues for a “principle of divisibility”: “It says
that . . . where a hundred acts like mine are necessary to cause a detectable difference I
have caused 1/100 of that detectable harm.” Glover, supra note 15, at 174.
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mine does. I am not aware of suggestions, however, that the connection between GHG emissions and global warming has this sort of
structure!
This line of thought suggests that a scheme of liability for global
warming should target the largest discrete actors—namely, governmental entities. If the quantity of emissions produced by firms or individuals within the territory of the United States over some stretch of
time was sufficiently large to cause, and to have been expected to
cause, a change in global temperatures, then it is plausible that the
government of the United States acted wrongfully in encouraging or
22
failing to reduce those emissions. Combining this suggestion with
my suggestion earlier that compensation might be paid to a governmental entity for damage to the environment within its jurisdiction,
what emerges is this: A government-versus-government structure for
global warming liability seems particularly promising as a matter of
CJ. For example, Australia might seek redress from the United States
for damage to Australia’s coral reefs that emissions from the United
States, as a whole, caused and that the U.S. government allowed. This
government-versus-government structure seems to involve compensation for a loss that is a protected interest (the environmental resource
understood as public property); the causal issues, however thorny, are
less so than in the case of compensation for private property losses or
individual injuries or deaths; and a government’s inaction in the face
of GHG emissions may well be wrongful, by actually making a difference to global temperatures, even if individual or firm emissions are
not.
But there is a further wrinkle, having to do with one sort of remedy that Farber proposes: namely, ex ante compensation to monitor
23
and prevent future harms.
While a claim by Australia against the
United States for past damage to its coral reefs seems plausible as a
matter of CJ, a claim by Australia against the United States for money
to fund steps that will ward off possible future damage to Australia’s
reefs is less plausible.
The key difficulty is that risk imposition is not itself a welfare set24
back. By analogy (if not by strict deduction), the risk of infringing a
22

To be sure, pure inaction may not be wrongful as a matter of CJ, but I assume
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protected interest does not itself infringe a protected interest. If I
am likely to trespass on your property or body, but have not yet done
so (and the likelihood of my doing so does not scare you), I have not
yet wronged you and, thus, have not yet done anything that would trig26
ger an obligation to repair under CJ .
Indeed, tort law generally
27
does not compensate for pure risk imposition.
So-called “loss of
chance” cases involve a special relationship between the plaintiff and
28
defendant, such as that between doctor and patient. The medical
monitoring cases, which seem to provide a helpful analogy for Far29
ber, are controversial and, in any event, typically involve something
additional to the pure risk of possible future injury and the pure economic loss of monitoring costs—in particular, a current physical im30
pact, such as exposure to a toxin.
Australia’s claim to recover from the United States now, to fund a
program to monitor and mitigate future damage to its coral reefs,
looks like compensation for pure risk imposition or pure economic
loss, and is therefore problematic as a matter of CJ.
In conclusion, I suggest that CJ may warrant a compensation
mechanism for global warming, but that the structure of that mechanism may be quite distinctive: namely, compensation by governments
to other governments for past (not expected) environmental damage.
Given a causal link between GHGs and global warming, it seems very
plausible that GHG emissions by sufficiently large actors are substantial moral wrongs. But one should not leap from that premise to the
conclusion that a compensation scheme will be supported by considerations of CJ simply because it channels resources from GHG emitters to those suffering or likely to suffer the effects of global warming.

25

This is not strict deduction insofar as protected interests might be aspects of
autonomy or “personhood,” rather than of well-being.
26
Although it is arguable that the imposition of risk in a Bayesian sense does
amount to a dignitary harm, see Adler, supra note 16, at 1192-93, it is hard to see how
this line of thought supports ex ante remedies for global warming. Past GHG emissions by U.S. emitters that threaten future harm to coral reefs are hardly a dignitary
harm to Australia.
27
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